Managing public lands for equitable and sustainable development in Cambodia by Chan Sophal
1	  
	  




Managing	  Public	  Lands	  for	  Equitable	  and	  













18	  April	  2015	  	  









Acknowledgement:	   This	   work	   is	   carried	   out	   through	   a	   research	   grant	   and	  
technical	  support	  from	  the	  Mekong	  Economic	  Research	  Network	  -­‐	  a	  research	  
initiative	   managed	   by	   the	   Centre	   for	   Analysis	   and	   Forecasting	   (CAF)	   of	   the	  
Vietnam	  Academy	   of	   Social	   Sciences	   (VASS)	  with	   financial	   support	   from	   the	  
International	  Development	  Research	  Centre	  (IDRC),	  Canada	  (Project	  105220).	  
The	   views	   and	   any	   errors	   in	   the	   paper	   do	   not	   necessarily	   represent	   any	  
institution	  but	  are	  solely	  those	  of	  the	  author.	  	  





Table	  of	  Contents	  
	  
Abstract	  ..............................................................................................................	  5	  
I.	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................	  7	  
II.	  Evolution	  of	  ELCs	  and	  Public	  Land	  Management	  ...........................................	  9	  
2.1.	  Trend	  and	  Profile	  of	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  ..................................	  9	  
2.2.	  Cancellation	  of	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  ........................................	  18	  
2.3.	  Leopard	  Skin	  Policy	  (land	  titles	  for	  smallholders)	  ................................	  19	  
2.4.	  Social	  Land	  Concessions	  ........................................................................	  21	  
III.	  ELCs	  and	  SLCs	  in	  Practice	  .............................................................................	  23	  
3.1.	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  in	  Practice	  ...............................................	  23	  
3.2.	  Social	  Land	  Concessions	  in	  Practice	  ......................................................	  27	  
IV.	  Lessons	  Learned	  and	  Recommendations	  ....................................................	  29	  
List	  of	  References	  .............................................................................................	  34	  
	  
	  
List	  of	  Acronyms	  	  
	  
ELC	   Economic	  Land	  Concession	  	  
LASED	   Land	  Allocation	  for	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Development	  	  
LWD	   Life	  With	  Dignity	  	  
MAFF	   Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  Forestry,	  and	  Fisheries	  	  
MEF	   Ministry	  of	  Economy	  and	  Finance	  	  




MOE	   Ministry	  of	  Environment	  	  
ODC	   Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  	  
RGC	   Royal	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  	  
SLC	   Social	  Land	  Concession	  









Managing	  public	   lands,	  which	  accounted	   for	  80%	  of	   the	  country	  area	  until	  a	  
decade	   ago,	   has	   understandably	   proven	   a	   formidable	   task	   for	   a	   relatively	  
young	  government	  like	  the	  Royal	  Government	  of	  Cambodia	  (RGC).	  It	  has	  been	  
one	  of	  the	  hotly	  debated	  policy	  issues	  in	  the	  past	  20	  years,	  as	  Cambodia	  was	  
emerging	   from	   three	   decades	   of	   civil	   war	   and	   internal	   strife.	   After	   granting	  
more	   than	  10%	  of	   the	   country	   area	  or	  50%	  of	   the	   cultivatable	   land	  as	   large	  
scale	  concessions	  to	  private	  companies,	  mostly	  foreign	  owned,	  RGC	  reversed	  
the	   trend	   in	   2012	   by	   drastically	   distributing	   1.2	   million	   hectares	   of	   the	  
approximately	   11	   million	   hectare	   public	   lands	   to	   more	   than	   710,000	  
smallholders.	   The	   process	   has	   generated	   lessons	   learned	   not	   only	   for	  
Cambodia	  but	  also	  the	  other	  countries	  of	  late	  opening	  up.	  	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  private	  companies	  could	  have	  free	  access	  to	  using	  a	  large	  chunk	  
of	   productive	   land	   for	   70	   years	   or	   more	   was	   quite	   appealing	   to	   numerous	  
candidates	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  More	  than	  250	  applicants	  were	  successful	  
in	  getting	  a	   long	  term	  contract	   for	  a	   total	  of	  nearly	  2	  million	  hectares	  under	  
the	   name	   of	   economic	   land	   concessions	   (ELCs),	   mostly	   in	   a	   rigged	   process.	  
This	   was	   met	   with	   fierce	   protests	   by	   local	   residents	   including	   indigenous	  
people,	   often	   aided	   by	   environmentalists	   and	   human	   rights	   NGOs,	   as	   their	  
livelihoods	   were	   negatively	   affected	   by	   the	   operations	   of	   the	   investment	  
projects.	   Land	   disputes	   became	   almost	   a	   permanent	   headline	   in	   the	   local	  
press	   and	   a	   hot	   issue	   on	   human	   right	   reports.	   In	   May	   2012,	   RGC	   issued	   a	  
moratorium	  on	   granting	   ELCs	   and	   enforced	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   in	   the	  
ELC	   agreements	   to	   cancel	   or	   downsize	   at	   least	   40	   ELCs	   releasing	   231,000	  




The	  paper	  suggests	   that	   in	   retrospect	  Cambodia	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  
taking	   a	   different	   approach	   to	  managing	   public	   lands.	   A	  master	   plan	   should	  
have	   been	   constructed	   to	  make	   zoning	   in	   the	   country,	   identifying	  where	   to	  
preserve	  the	  biodiversity,	  wildlife,	  watersheds	  and	  cultural	  sites,	  and	  where	  to	  
be	   released	   for	   agricultural	   purposes,	   instead	   of	   inviting	   applications	   for	  
anywhere	   in	   the	   country	   and	   conducting	   patchy	   assessments	   before	   the	  
concessions	  were	  made	   to	   the	  applicants.	  Adequate	  measures	  were	  needed	  
for	  the	  regulations	  on	  ELCs	  to	  be	  respected.	  Then,	  an	  auction	  system	  should	  
be	  considered	  for	  the	  best	  use	  of	  the	  cultivable	  areas.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  
productive	  land	  is	  granted	  for	  free	  to	  investors.	  A	  transparent,	  easily	  verifiable	  
system	   should	   be	   employed	   to	   generate	   revenue	   from	   the	   lands.	   An	   area	  
based	  system,	  such	  as	  an	  amount	  of	  leasehold	  fee	  per	  hectare	  per	  year	  would	  
serve	  this	  purpose.	  	  
	  
Moving	   forward,	   it	   calls	   for	   continuous	   review	   of	   the	   existing	   concessions	  
against	   the	   agreements	   between	   the	   companies	   and	   government.	   Non-­‐
performing	   projects	   should	   be	   canceled,	   as	   some	   already	   so	   done	   by	  
government	   in	   the	   past	   two	   years.	   Land	   reallocation	   and	   redistribution	   to	  
smallholders,	  which	  has	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  recent	  past,	  are	  favourable	  for	  both	  
equity	  and	  efficiency	  reasons.	  For	  the	  operational	  projects,	  application	  of	  the	  
Investment	  Law,	  the	  Labour	  Law	  and	  Immigration	  Law	  is	  needed	  to	  ensure	  the	  
success	   of	   ELCs	   as	   intended.	   In	   addition,	   an	   incentive	   system	   should	   be	  
formulated	  to	  ensure	  adequate	  supply	  of	  labour	  in	  the	  ELC	  areas,	  while	  annual	  
tax	  on	  unused	  land	  should	  be	  extended	  into	  the	  ELC	  areas.	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In	  managing	   the	  public	   land,	  which	   spread	  80%	  of	   the	   country	  until	   10	   ago,	  
the	   Royal	   Government	   of	   Cambodia	   (RGC)	   has	   granted	   large	   lands	   for	  
agriculture	   investment	   under	   the	   name	   “Economic	   Land	   Concessions”	   (ELCs)	  
up	  to	  10,000	  hectares	  often	  for	  70	  years	  per	  company.	  The	  stated	  purpose	  of	  
such	  decision	  was	  to	  turn	  under-­‐utilised	  public	  lands,	  such	  as	  degraded	  forest	  
areas,	  into	  a	  more	  productive	  use	  so	  that	  it	  creates	  employment	  and	  income	  
for	   Cambodia’s	   citizens.	   The	   concessions	   were	   commonly	   for	   large	   scale	  
investment	  proposals	   in	  agro-­‐industrial	  plantation,	  processing	  and	  export.	  As	  
of	   June	  2012,	   the	   total	   land	   area	  of	   1,204,750	  hectares	  was	   granted	   to	   118	  
companies	   in	   the	   form	   of	   ELCs	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Agriculture,	   Forestry	   and	  
Fisheries	   (MAFF).	   Including	   the	  ELCs	  granted	  by	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Environment	  
and	   other	   government	   agencies,	   various	   sources	   have	   the	   total	   figure	   at	  
around	  2	  million	  hectares	  under	  ELCs.	  	  
	  
Such	  numerous	  ELCs	  appear	  excessive,	  covering	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  country	  
area	   or	   50%	   of	   cultivable	   land.	   In	   addition,	   there	   are	   other	   large	   scale	  
concessions	   of	   state-­‐land	   for	   mining	   and	   development	   concessions.	   These	  
often	   have	   adversely	   affected	   the	   livelihoods	   and	   land	   use	   tenure	   rights	   of	  
local	   residents.	   Furthermore,	   such	   practices	   threatened	   Cambodia’s	   rich	  
biodiversity	   as	   well	   as	   future	   agricultural	   land	   access	   by	   the	   increasing	  
population.	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  most	  of	  the	  approved	  projects	  have	  not	  
been	   operational	   for	   various	   reasons.	   In	   some	   concession	   areas,	   conflicts	  
occurred	   over	   the	   land	   that	   has	   not	   been	   used	   and	   thus	   encroached	   by	  
villagers	   and	   outsiders,	   and	   this	   appeared	   constantly	   in	   the	   public	   media	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within	   and	   outside	   the	   country,	   creating	   huge	   political	   pressures	   on	   the	  
government	  or	  the	  ruling	  party.	  	  
	  
RGC	   therefore	   reversed	   the	   trend	   of	   granting	   numerous	   economic	   land	  
concessions	   by	   issuing	   a	   moratorium	   on	   granting	   new	   ELCs	   in	   May	   2011,	  
though	   still	   approving	  projects	   in	   the	  pipelines	   for	   a	   few	  more	  months,	   and	  
providing	  a	  very	  large	  amount	  of	  land	  titles	  to	  smallholders	  residing	  within	  the	  
ELC	   areas.	   Furthermore,	   in	   the	   past	   two	   years	   following	   a	   huge	   setback	   in	  
general	   elections,	   RGC	   moved	   to	   cancel	   a	   number	   of	   ELCs	   that	   had	   been	  
inactive	  or	  not	  operated	  according	  to	  the	  agreements.	  These	  actions	  are	  well	  
applauded.	  However,	   there	   is	  still	  a	  need	  to	  review	  more	  ELCs,	  draw	  lessons	  
learned,	   re-­‐approach	   the	   public	   land	   management	   before	   and	   after	   the	  
concessions.	  This	  will	  be	  not	  only	  useful	  for	  Cambodia	  but	  also	  other	  countries	  
that	   have	   opened	   up	   large	   public	   lands	   for	   large	   scale	   investment	  
opportunities.	  	  	  
	  
The	   overall	   policy	   research	   question	   is	   “What	   should	   be	   the	   approach	   to	  
manage	   public	   lands	   for	   equitable	   and	   sustainable	   development	   in	  
Cambodia?”	   This	   policy	   question	   will	   be	   elaborated	   by	   the	   analysis	   of	  
efficiency	   of	   land	   use	   by	   size,	   based	   on	   both	   the	   technical	   and	   ethnical	  
aspects.	  Lessons	   learned	  from	  the	  past	  20	  years	   in	  Cambodia	  will	   shed	   light	  
on	  better	  processes	  in	  land	  use	  policy	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  For	  on-­‐going	  large	  
scale	  projects,	  the	  question	  is	  how	  to	  ensure	  the	  best	  interest	  from	  the	  lands	  
be	  maximised	  and	  fairly	  distributed	  in	  a	  sustainable	  manner.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
It	   is	  expected	   that	  a	   round	   table	  will	  be	  conducted	  with	  policymakers	   in	   the	  
Ministry	  of	  Land	  Management,	  Urban	  Planning	  and	  Construction,	  Ministry	  of	  
Agriculture,	  Forestry	  and	  Fisheries,	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Environment,	  Ministry	  of	  
Mines	   and	   Energy,	   Ministry	   of	   Planning,	   the	   Council	   for	   Development	   of	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Cambodia,	   and	   key	   stakeholders	   for	   validation	   and	   discussions	   before	   the	  
paper	   is	   possibly	   printing	   for	   consumption	   by	   national	   and	   international	  
community.	  	  	  	  	  
II.	  Evolution	  of	  ELCs	  and	  Public	  Land	  Management	  
	  
2.1.	  Trend	  and	  Profile	  of	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  	  
	  
The	  awarding	  of	  ELCs	  is	  a	  mechanism	  that	  allows	  the	  government	  to	  grant	  the	  
state	   private	   land	   through	   a	   specific	   land	   concession	   contract	   to	   a	  
concessionaire	   to	   utilize	   for	   agricultural	   and	   industrial-­‐agricultural	  
exploitation,	   which	   includes	   cultivation	   of	   food	   crops	   or	   industrial	   crops,	  
raising	  animals	  and	  aquaculture,	   construction	   such	  as	  a	  plant	  or	   factory	  and	  
facilities	   for	   the	   processing	   of	   domestic	   agricultural	   raw	   materials,	   or	   a	  
combination	  of	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  above	  activities	  (Sub-­‐decree	  No.	  146,	  2005).	  	  
	  
According	   to	   the	   Sub-­‐decree,	   ELCs	   shall	   be	   granted	   to	   achieve	   the	   following	  
purposes:	  
	  
1. To	   develop	   intensive	   agricultural	   and	   industrial-­‐agricultural	   activities	  
that	   require	   a	   high	   rate	   and	   appropriate	   level	   of	   initial	   capital	  
investment,	  
2. To	   achieve	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   agreements	   from	   the	   investor	   for	  
developing	  the	  land	  in	  an	  appropriate	  and	  perpetual	  manner	  based	  on	  
a	  land	  use	  plan	  for	  the	  area,	  
3. To	   increase	   employment	   in	   rural	   areas	   within	   a	   framework	   of	  
intensification	  and	  diversification	  of	  livelihood	  opportunities	  and	  within	  




4. To	   encourage	   small	   as	   well	   as	   large	   investments	   in	   economic	   land	  
concession	  projects,	  and	  	  
5. To	   generate	   state	   revenues	   or	   the	   provincial	   or	   communal	   revenues	  
through	  economic	  land	  use	  fees,	  taxation	  and	  related	  services	  charges.	  
	  
Although	  the	  Land	  Law	  20011	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  grant	  economic	  land	  
concessions	  to	  either	  a	  natural	  or	  a	  legal	  person	  up	  to	  the	  maximum	  of	  10,000	  
hectares	  for	  the	  period	  of	  up	  to	  99	  years,	  the	  government’s	  Sub-­‐decree	  on	  the	  
procedure	  for	  granting	  ELCs	  was	  not	  developed	  and	  adopted	  until	  Dec	  2005.2	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  practice	  of	  providing	  ELCs,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.1,	  could	  be	  
traced	  back	  to	  1995.	  The	  Land	  Law	  2001	  acknowledges	  such	  facts	  anyway	  and	  
requires	  that	  those	  already	  granted	  ELCs	  abide	  by	  new	  regulations.	  	  
	  
Since	  1995,	  RGC	  has	  granted	  a	  total	  of	  approximately	  200	  ELCs.	  In	  the	  process,	  
a	  number	  of	  ELCs	  were	  cancelled	  and	  then	  re-­‐granted	  to	  different	  applicants.	  
Figure	  1.1	   illustrates	   that	   quite	   a	   large	   amount	  of	   ELCs	  was	   awarded	  during	  
2011	  and	  2012,	  before	   the	   government’s	  moratorium	  on	  granting	  new	  ELCs	  
issued	  in	  May	  2012.	  ELCs	  granted	  in	  the	  two	  years	  represent	  more	  than	  half	  of	  
the	  total	  ELCs	  granted.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.1:	  Trend	  of	  Granting	  ELCs	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Chapter	  5,	  article	  48-­‐62.	  	  




Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  data	  available	  from	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  
(30	  Mar	  2015)	  
	  
The	   official	   data	   on	   ELCs	   is	   incomplete	   and	   thus	   has	   been	   controversial.	  
According	   to	   the	   Sub-­‐decree	   on	   ELCs	   adopted	   in	   2005,	   MAFF	   is	   the	   only	  
ministry	  authorized	  by	  RGC	  to	  grant	  ELCs	  to	  investors.	  However,	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Environment	   (MOE),	   which	   is	   tasked	   to	   manage	   about	   three	   million	  
hectares	  of	  protected	  areas,	  and	  the	  ministry	  of	  economy	  and	  finance	  (MEF)	  
have	   also	   been	   involved	   in	   awarding	   ELCs,	   although	   in	   reality	   the	   Prime	  
Minister	  was	  requested	  to	  endorse	  the	  concessions.	  	  MAFF	  has	  made	  ELC	  data	  
available	   on	   its	   website3,	   but	   the	   data	   appears	   incomplete	   and	   does	   not	  
represent	   all	   the	   ELCs	   that	   have	   been	   granted	   by	   RGC.	   Prominent	   NGOs4,	  
through	   their	   networks	   and	   collaboration	  with	   partners,	   collect	   information	  
and	  investigate	  land	  cases	  across	  the	  country	  and	  try	  to	  make	  complete	  data	  
available	  to	  the	  public.	  	  
	  
The	   data	  mismatch	   is	   huge	   and	  worth	   discussing.	  MAFF	   reported5	  that	   “the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  www.elc.maff.gov.kh	  or	  www.maff.gov.kh/elc	  	  
4	  For instance, Licadho, ADHOC, NGO Forum, CHRAC, CCHR, and CLEC	  
5	  The	  figure	  does	  not	  include	  those	  granted	  by	  MOE	  although	  it	  counts	  24	  ELCs	  granted	  by	  MEF.	  










Royal	  Government	  of	  Cambodia,	  as	  of	  08	  June	  2012,	  has	  totally	  granted	  ELCs	  
to	   118	   companies	   on	   the	   total	   land	   area	   of	   1.2	   million	   hectares”;	   while	  
Licadho’s	   recent	   statement	   announced	   the	   total	   ELCs	   amounted	   2.1	  million	  
hectares 6 .	   Open	   Development	   Cambodia	   (ODC)	   collected	   and	   verified	  
information	  on	  ELCs	   from	  all	   sources	  available	   through	  public	  domains;	   then	  
collated	  them	  and	  published	  on	  its	  website7.	  	  
	  
For	   the	   sake	   of	   contributing	   to	   the	   generation	   of	   knowledge	   on	   ELCs	   in	  
Cambodia,	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  section	  is	  based	  on	  the	  data	  available	  from	  ODC	  
website,	   but	   focusing	   on	   data	   from	   two	  major	   categories:	   government	   data	  
complete8	  and	   government	   data	   partial9.	   Both	   types	   of	   data	   comprise	   264	  
ELCs	  (191	  and	  73	  respectively)	  out	  of	  300	  ELCs	  in	  the	  database.10	  The	  264	  ELCs	  
include	  the	  ones	  whose	  sizes	  are	  both	  less	  than	  and	  over	  1,000	  hectares.	  The	  
two	  types	  of	  data	  are	  chosen	  for	  the	  analysis	  because	  they	  have	  evidence	  with	  
reference	  to	  the	  government	  documents	  while	  data	  from	  other	  types	  appears	  
less	  credible.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.2:	  Proportion	  of	  ELCs	  granted	  by	  different	  government	  ministries	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  LICADHO	  (2015)	  Opens	  up	  its	  Land	  Concessions	  Data,	  Urges	  Full	  Transparency	  	  
from	  the	  Government,	  http://www.licadho-­‐cambodia.org/pressrelease.php?perm=380	  	  
7	  www.opendevelopmentcambodia.net	  
8	  information	  obtained	  from	  official	  government	  sources	  with	  official	  legal	  documentation	  in	  the	  
following	  identification	  fields:	  company	  name,	  location,	  GPS	  coordinate	  and/or	  analog	  map,	  and	  
purpose	  (rubber,	  corn,	  etc.)	  
9	  information	   obtained	   from	   official	   government	   sources	  with	   official	   legal	   documentation	   but	  
missing	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   following	   identification	   fields:	   company	   name,	   location,	   GPS	  
coordinate	  and/or	  analog	  map,	  and	  purpose	  (rubber,	  corn,	  etc.)	  




Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  data	  available	  from	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  
(30	  Mar	  2015)	  
	  
All	   the	   264	   ELCs	   with	   information	   obtained	   from	   the	   government	   sources	  
cover	   a	   total	   area	   of	   1.8	   million	   hectares,	   which	   is	   about	   85%	   of	   all	   300	  
projects	  recorded	  in	  the	  ODC	  database	  or	  of	  2.1	  million	  hectares	  reported	  by	  
Licadho.	   If	   the	   1.2	   million	   hectares	   reported	   by	   MAFF	   representing	   ELCs	  
approved	  by	  MAFF	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  62%	  of	  all	  ELCs	  granted	  by	  MAFF	  in	  
Figure	  1.2	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  reality,	  the	  total	  area	  of	  ELC	  could	  be	  around	  1.9	  
million	   hectares.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   data	   from	   the	   central	   government	  
agencies	  may	   not	   be	   exhaustive.	   For	   instance,	   the	   provincial	   government	   in	  
Kampong	   Thom	   province	   report	   a	   total	   land	   concession	   area	   for	   rice	  
cultivation	  of	  26,800	  hectares11,	  but	   the	  data	  available	   from	  ODC	   show	  only	  
12,900	  hectares	  dedicated	   for	   rice	  purpose.	  All	   these	   help	   explain	   that	   the	  
total	  ELC	  area	  could	  be	  between	  1.8	  and	  2	  million	  hectares.	  	  	  
	  
As	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.1,	  the	  ELCs	  are	  spread	  across	  18	  out	  of	  23	  provinces12	  in	  
Cambodia,	   but	   concentrated	   in	   just	   five	   provinces,	   where	   pubic	   land,	  
essentially	   forest,	   was	   more	   abundant.	   One	   particular	   ELC	   was	   the	   largest,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Exploring	   the	   trade	  pattern	  and	  developmental	   implications	  of	   land	  concessions:	   the	   case	  of	  
Cambodia,	  Lao	  people’s	  democratic	  republic	  and	  Thailand.	  	  
12	  Phnom	  Penh	  capital	  is	  not	  included	  because	  it	  is	  mainly	  urban	  and	  thus	  not	  within	  the	  subject	  









sizing	  315,028	  hectares,	  cutting	  across	  three	  provinces	  of	  Kampong	  Chhnang,	  
Pursat	  and	  Kampong	  Speu.	  This	  size	  is	  31.5	  times	  above	  the	  legal	  permit	  but	  it	  
was	  granted	  well	  before	  the	  Sub-­‐decree	  on	  ELCs	  was	  produced	  and	  approved.	  
The	  distribution	  of	  these	  ELCs	  could	  be	  visually	  viewed	  from	  Figure	  1.4,	  which	  
is	  based	  on	  Licadho’s	  report.	  	  
	  
Table	  1.1:	  Geographical	  Distribution	  of	  Granted	  ELCs	  	  	  






(including	  Pursat	  and	  
Kampong	  Speu)	   1	   315,028	   17%	  
2	   Kratie	   60	   280,312	   15%	  
3	   Mondulkiri	   31	   208,510	   12%	  
4	   Ratanakiri	   29	   192,347	   11%	  
5	   Preah	  Vihear	   26	   182,113	   10%	  
6	   Kampong	  Thom	   27	   112,407	   6%	  
7	   Kampong	  Speu	   17	   110,847	   6%	  
8	   Oddar	  Meanchey	   17	   110,219	   6%	  
9	   Stung	  Treng	   13	   101,241	   6%	  
10	   Kampot	   5	   45,306	   3%	  
11	   Siem	  Reap	   7	   39,835	   2%	  
12	   Koh	  Kong	   9	   38,573	   2%	  
13	   Battambang	   4	   21,852	   1%	  
14	   Kampong	  Cham	   5	   18,850	   1%	  
15	   Preah	  Sihanouk	   7	   16,658	   1%	  
16	   Banteay	  Meanchey	   2	   9,000	   0%	  
17	   Pursat	   3	   7,219	   0%	  
18	   Svay	  Rieng	   1	   1,200	   0%	  
15	  
	  
	  	   Total	   264	   1,811,517	   100%	  
Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  data	  available	  from	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  
(30	  Mar	  2015)	  
	  
Table	  1.2:	  Purpose	  of	  Production	  (Land	  Use)	  on	  Granted	  ELCs	  	  




Rubber	  and	  other	  agro-­‐
industrial	  crops	   175	   988,383	   55%	  
2	   Tree	  plantation	   1	   315,028	   17%	  
3	   Industrial	  tree	  plantation	   21	   154,481	   9%	  
4	   Sugarcane	   14	   73,186	   4%	  
5	   Animal	  husbandry	   8	   50,550	   3%	  
6	   Cassava	   8	   41,967	   2%	  
7	   Oil	  palms	   4	   40,279	   2%	  
8	   Cashew	   3	   16,853	   1%	  
9	   Eco-­‐tourism	   2	   16,556	   1%	  
10	   Rice	   5	   12,904	   1%	  
11	   Corn	   1	   9,800	   1%	  
12	   Agro-­‐tourism	   1	   4,280	   0%	  
13	   Aquaculture	   1	   63	   0%	  
14	   Other	   20	   87,187	   5%	  
	  	   Total	   264	  
1,811,51
7	   100%	  
Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  data	  available	  from	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  
(30	  Mar	  2015)	  
	  
Most	   of	   the	   ELCs	   are	   meant	   for	   non-­‐food	   production.	   The	   ELCs	   for	   food	  
production	  purposes	  such	  as	  rice,	  corn,	  cashew,	  and	  aquaculture	  account	  for	  
16	  
	  
about	   40,000	   hectares	   or	   only	   2.2%	   of	   the	   total	   ELC	   area	   granted.	   The	  
prominent	   feature	   of	   non-­‐food	   crop	   production	   on	   the	   ELC	   is	   rubber	  
plantation.	   As	   shown	   in	   Table	   1.2,	   175	   ELCs	   were	   granted	   on	   around	   one	  
million	   hectares	   (or	   55%	   of	   total	   ELC	   area)	   for	   this	   purpose	   of	   rubber	  
production.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  ODC,	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  ELCs	  does	  not	  display	  information	  
on	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  investors.	  As	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1.3,	  the	  nationality	  of	  
investors	  who	  obtained	  36%	  of	  the	  ELCs	  is	  unknown	  due	  to	  missing	  data.	  From	  
the	   known	   data,	   Cambodians	   possess	   38%	   of	   the	   ELC	   area,	   of	   which	   an	  
outstanding	  case	  in	  Kampong	  Chhnang	  alone	  represent	  17%.	  Other	  26%	  were	  
granted	   to	   foreign	   investors,	   in	   which	   China	   and	   Vietnam	   enjoy	   almost	   an	  
equal	   share	   of	   17%	   each.	   Other	   countries	   of	   investors	   include	   Malaysia,	  
Thailand,	   Singapore,	   Korea,	   USA,	   Taiwan,	   and	   France.	   The	   missing	   data	  
complicates	  the	  analysis.	  However,	  data	  from	  Ngo	  and	  Chan	  (2010)	  indicates	  
that	   60%	   of	   the	   ELCs	   granted	   during	   1995-­‐2009	   was	   given	   to	   Cambodians,	  
leaving	  the	  rest	  40%	  to	  foreign	  investors.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  recent	  report	  
by	   Licadho	   (2015)	   shows	   more	   than	   50%	   of	   ELCs	   was	   awarded	   to	   non-­‐
Cambodian	   investors	   (see	   Figure	   1.4),	   with	   Chinese	   and	   Vietnamese	  
companies	  received	  roughly	  350,000	  hectares	  each13.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.3:	  ELCs	  classified	  by	  nationality	  of	  investors	  (1995-­‐2012)	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  data	  available	  from	  Open	  Development	  Cambodia	  
(30	  Mar	  2015)	  
	  
Figure	  1.4:	  Distribution	  of	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  by	  nationality	  of	  
investors	  
	  	  	  
	  
Source:	  Licadho	  (2015),	  http://www.licadho-­‐cambodia.org/land_concessions/	  


























2.2.	  Cancellation	  of	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  issuance	  of	  the	  moratorium	  in	  May	  2012	  on	  granting	  new	  ELCs,	  
the	   government	   formulated	   an	   inter-­‐ministerial	   committee	   to	   conduct	   a	  
nationwide	   review	   of	   ELCs	   with	   an	   aim	   to	   cancel	   the	   projects	   that	   do	   not	  
abide	  by	  the	  law	  and	  ELC	  contracts.	  Since	  then,	  MOE	  and	  MAFF	  have	  cancelled	  
and	  downsized	  many	  ELCs.	  There	  has	  been	  some	  specific	  information	  released	  
about	  the	  cancelled	  or	  downsized	  ELCs,	  but	  not	  all	  of	  them	  yet	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  current	  report	  writing,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  single	  source	  of	  information	  on	  the	  
status	   of	   ELCs	   that	   have	   been	   reviewed,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ones	   that	   were	  
cancelled	  or	  downsized.	  	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   information	   released	   by	   the	   Council	   of	   Ministers	   and	   press	  
releases,	  and	  conferences	  by	  MAFF	  and	  MOE	  covered	  by	  the	  media,	  RGC	  has	  
so	   far	   cancelled	  and	  downsized	  at	   least	  40	  ELCs	  on	  a	   total	  area	  of	  231,000	  
hectares.	  MOE	  withdrew	  117,000	  hectares	  back	   from	  26	  ELCs14	  in	  2014,	  and	  
took	   back	   an	   additional	   9,000	   hectares15	  during	   early	   2015	   and	   placed	   14	  
companies	  on	   its	  watch	   list	   for	   further	  review.	  During	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  
22	  January	  2015,	  MAFF	  announced	  that	  it	  had	  cancelled	  eight	  ELCs	  on	  a	  total	  
area	  of	  50,000	  hectares16	  since	   the	  national	   election	   in	   July	  2013.	  On	   top	  of	  
that,	   the	  ministry	   reported	   four	  ELCs	  were	  reduced	  by	  a	   total	  area	  of	  nearly	  
100,000	  hectares.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Khuon	  Narim	  (Cambodia	  Daily,	  7	  Jan	  2015)	  	  
15	  Aun	  Pheap	  (Cambodia	  Daily,	  10	  Mar	  2015).	  
16	  Aun	  Pheap	  (Cambodia	  Daily,	  22	  Jan	  2015)	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2.3.	  Leopard	  Skin	  Policy	  (land	  titles	  for	  smallholders)	  
	  
As	   part	   of	   the	   initiative	   implementing	   new	   action	   on	   old	   (existing)	   policy	   in	  
land	  sector,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  declared	  the	  decision	  (known	  as	  Order	  01)	  to	  
resolve	   land	   conflicts	   between	   the	   companies/concessionaires	   and	   affected	  
people,	   and	   thus	   provided	   land	   titles	   to	   the	   people,	   particularly	   the	   ones	  
locating	  inside	  the	  ELCs,	  which	  would	  then	  make	  the	  ELCs	  look	  like	  a	  leopard	  
skin.	  The	  initiative	  aimed	  to	  provide	  around	  1.8	  million	  hectares17	  to	  the	  local	  
people.	  More	  than	  1,000	  youth	  volunteers	   (mostly	  university	  students)	  were	  
recruited	   and	   deployed	   to	   work	   alongside	   concerned	   officials	   in	   different	  
provinces	  in	  2012	  and	  2013.	  	  
	  
In	  effect,	   the	  mission	  of	  Order	  01	  has,	  as	  of	  30	  November	  2014,	  concluded	  
with	  more	   than	   710,000	  plots	   (1.2	  million	  hectares)	  measured	  and	  publicly	  
displayed	  across	  357	  communes18.	  The	  number	  of	  land	  titles	  that	  have	  already	  
been	   handed	   to	   the	   people	   is	   very	   high,	   610,000	   or	   86%	   of	   the	   measured	  
ones.	   This	   level	   of	   achievement	   within	   a	   16	   month	   period	   is	   spectacular.	  
Putting	  things	  in	  context,	  the	  number	  710,000	  plots	  issued	  within	  about	  a	  year	  
is	   approximately	   23%	   of	   the	   land	   titles	   issued	   through	   the	   systematic	   land	  
titling	  over	  more	  than	  10	  years;	  while	  the	  coverage	  of	  357	  communes	  is	  about	  
22%	  of	  all	  communes	  and	  sangkats	  across	  Cambodia.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.5:	  Sources	  of	  land	  for	  land	  titles	  under	  Order	  01	  [total	  1.2	  million	  
hectares]	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Ben	  Sokhean	  and	  Holly	  Robertson	  (Cambodia	  Daily,	  1	  August	  2014)	  	  
18	  MLMUPC’s	  Announcement	  (dated	  on	  17	  Dec	  2014),	  from	  






Source:	  MLMUPC’s	  Announcement	  (dated	  on	  17	  Dec	  2014)	  	  
from	  http://www.mlmupc.gov.kh/mlm/imgs/scan0003_Page_2.pdf	  (retrieved,	  
12	  April	  2015)	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  land	  size	  distributed	  under	  Order	  01,	  the	  government	  had	  cut	  
around	   1.2	   million	   hectares	   from	   three	   major	   sources:	   more	   than	   380,000	  
hectares	  from	  142	  ELC	  companies;	  more	  than	  270,000	  hectares	  from	  17	  forest	  
concession	   companies;	   and	   530,000	   hectares	   from	   state	   land	   and	   former	  
forestland.	   This	   suggests	   an	   average	   land	   size	   per	   titled	   plot	   is	   around	   1.7	  
hectares.	  	  
	  
All	  these	  achievements	  are	  plausible;	  1.2	  million	  hectares	   is	  quite	  significant,	  
especially	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  size	  of	  granted	  ELCs.	  However,	  no	  details	  of	  data	  
have	   been	   made	   available	   to	   tracking	   and	   study	   purposes.	   Given	   just	  
aggregate	   data	   available	   from	   MLMUPC,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   understand	   the	  
number	   as	   well	   as	   characteristics	   and	   distribution	   of	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	  
program.	  	  
	  












2.4.	  Social	  Land	  Concessions	  	  
	  
The	  government’s	  policy	   to	  distribute	   land	   to	   the	  people	   for	   social	  purposes	  
was	   reflected	   in	   a	   sub-­‐decree	   issued	   in	  March	   2003,	   Sub-­‐decree	   No.	   19	   on	  
Social	   Land	  Concessions	   (SLCs).	  SLCs	  may	  be	  granted	   for	  one	  or	  more	  of	   the	  
following	  social	  purposes:	  
	  
1. Provide	  land	  for	  residential	  purposes	  to	  poor	  homeless	  families,	  
2. Provide	  land	  to	  poor	  families	  for	  family	  farming,	  
3. Provide	   land	   to	   resettle	   families	   who	   have	   been	   displaced	   resulting	  
from	  public	  infrastructure	  development,	  
4. Provide	  land	  to	  the	  families	  suffering	  from	  natural	  disaster,	  
5. Provide	  land	  to	  repatriated	  families,	  
6. Provide	  land	  to	  demobilized	  soldiers	  and	  families	  of	  soldiers	  who	  were	  
disabled	  or	  died	  in	  the	  line	  of	  duty,	  
7. Facilitate	  economic	  development,	  
8. Facilitate	   economic	   land	   concessions	   by	   providing	   land	   to	  workers	   of	  
large	  plantations	  for	  residential	  purposes	  or	  family	  farming,	  
9. Develop	  areas	  that	  have	  not	  been	  appropriately	  developed.	  
	  
Under	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐decree	   on	   SLCs,	   there	   are	   two	   types	   of	  
programs	  that	  a	  social	   land	  concession	  project	  could	  be	  initiated:	   local	  social	  
land	  concession	  program	  and	  national	   social	   land	  concession	  program.	  Local	  
social	  land	  concession	  could	  be	  proposed	  by	  commune	  councils;	  one	  or	  more	  
citizens	   or	   organizations	   working	   with	   or	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   citizens	   in	   the	  
commune	  can	  also	  initiate	  the	  social	  land	  concession	  proposal	  but	  that	  has	  to	  
be	  done	  through	  the	  commune	  council.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  national	  social	  
land	   concession	   program	   could	   be	   initiated	   by	   one	   or	   more	   concerned	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ministries	   or	   institutions	   in	   situations	   that	   are	   not	   suitable	   for	   a	   local	   social	  
land	  concession	  program.	  	  
	  
As	  presented	  in	  Table	  1.3,	  around	  20,000	  hectares	  of	  social	   land	  concessions	  
have	  so	  far	  been	  distributed	  and	  more	  than	  6,200	  families.	  These	  social	   land	  
concessions	   have	   been	   implemented	   through	   a	   few	   mechanisms.	   The	  
government	   has	   provided	   approximately	   10,000	   hectares	   through	   its	   own	  
funded	   projects	   to	   around	   3,000	   poor	   families	   including	   families	   of	   slum	  
dwellers,	   families	  of	  demobilized	  soldiers	  and	  soldiers	  who	  were	  disabled	  or	  
died	   in	   the	   line	   of	   duty.	   The	   social	   land	   concession	   was	   also	   distributed	  
through	  a	  land	  allocation	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  development	  project	  called	  
LASED19	  (2008-­‐2013),	   implemented	   by	   MLMUPC	   with	   support	   from	   the	  WB	  
and	   GIZ.	   LASED	   provided	   more	   than	   6,250	   hectares	   to	   more	   than	   1,600	  
families.	  Other	  two	  projects	  of	  social	   land	  concessions	  were	  implemented	  by	  
two	  NGOs	  called	  LWD	  and	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity	  International.	  	  
	  
Table	  1.3:	  Implementation	  of	  social	  economic	  land	  concessions	  
Project/Implementing	  Agency	   Size	  (ha)	   Beneficiaries	  (hh)	  
Government-­‐own	  SLC	  projects	   10,000	   3,000	  
LASED/MLMUPC	   6,250	   1,604	  
LWD	  (1)	   3,847	   1,293	  
Habitat	  for	  Humanity	  International	  
(2)	   2	   334	  
	  	   20,099	   6,231	  
(1)	  Community	  Empowerment	  through	  Access	  to	  Land	  Project	  
(2)	  Strengthening	  Civil	  Society-­‐Government	  Partnership	  to	  Deliver	  Land	  
Tenure	  Security	  Project	  
Source:	  RGC,	  2012	  (NSDP	  2009-­‐2013	  Mid-­‐term	  Review)	  and	  interview	  with	  key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Land	  Allocation	  for	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Development	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informants	  	  	  
	  
The	  implementation	  of	  the	  social	  land	  concessions	  has	  so	  far	  proved	  a	  positive	  
step.	   Currently	   there	   are	   no	   social	   land	   concession	   projects	   active	   either	  
through	   LASED	   or	   other	   means,	   except	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   land	   tilting	  
program	   for	   smallholders	   through	   Order	   01,	   which	   can	   be	   well	   considered	  
social	   land	   concession.	   The	   main	   difference	   between	   the	   recent	   vast	  
distribution	   of	   land	   to	   smallholders	   and	   LASED	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   provides	  
complementary	   infrastructure	   and	   services	   for	   the	   new	   settlers,	   while	   the	  
former	  essentially	  recognizes	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  residents	  at	  the	  place.	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  proven	  in	  various	  studies	  that	  small	  farms	  are	  more	  efficient	  than	  
large	   farms.	   This	   lends	   support	   to	   the	   social	   land	   concession.	   Among	  many	  
factors,	  smallholders	  tend	  to	  be	  able	  to	  get	  more	  out	  of	  one	  hectare	  of	  land,	  
while	   the	   large	   holders	   suffer	   from	   challenge	   of	   managing	   many	   layers	   of	  
labour.	   Anecdotes	   in	   Cambodia	   point	  well	   to	   this	   general	   occurrence	   at	   the	  
production	   level.	   However,	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   processing	   and	   marketing,	   it	  
stands	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   scale	   matters.	   It	   calls	   for	   better	   coordination	   of	  
smallholders,	  which	  is	  often	  best	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cooperatives.	  	  	  
III.	  ELCs	  and	  SLCs	  in	  Practice	  
	  
3.1.	  Economic	  Land	  Concessions	  in	  Practice	  
	  
The	  consequence	  of	  the	  ELC	  implementation	  has	  been	  a	  mix	  of	  both	  positive	  
and	  negative	  although	  there	  has	  been	  no	  robust	  study	  to	  weigh	  the	  gains	  and	  
losses.	  On	  the	  positive	  side,	  the	  ELCs	   in	  full	  operations	  brought	  the	  inflow	  of	  
foreign	   capital	   and	   technology;	   created	   jobs;	   increased	   productivity	   and	  
domestic	   production	   including	   manufacturing;	   paid	   rents	   and	   taxes;	   and	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fueled	   export	   of	   commodity	   and	   final	   goods	   for	   earning	   foreign	   exchanges.	  
However,	  all	  these	  benefits	  are	  not	  properly	  accounted	  yet.	  Meanwhile,	  ELCs	  
have	  proven	  negative	  implications	  on	  the	  livelihood	  and	  tradition	  and	  culture	  
of	  the	  local	  people,	  especially	  the	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Often,	  the	  ELCs	  overlap	  
the	   community	   people’s	   lands,	   which	   include	   residential	   land,	   agricultural	  
land,	   spirit	   forest	   and	   burial	   ground	   of	   the	   indigenous	   peoples.	   People	   lost	  
their	  lands	  and	  thus	  protest	  against	  the	  companies.	  Moreover,	  ELCs	  were	  also	  
accused	  to	  have	  negative	  impacts	  on	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  country’s	  rich	  
biodiversity	  since	  they	  generally	  have	  to	  clear	  the	  natural	   forests	   in	  order	  to	  
grow	  rubber	  or	  other	  crops.	  	  	  
	  
According	  to	  The	  NGO	  Forum	  on	  Cambodia	  (2014),	  there	  have	  been	  405	  cases	  
of	   land	   disputes	   since	   1994.	   The	   disputes	   involved	   65,867	   households	  
(approximately	   300,000	   people)	   nationwide.	   Nonetheless,	   ELCs	   are	  
responsible	  for	  26%	  of	  the	  land	  disputes,	  which	  related	  to	  145,000	  hectares	  of	  
agricultural	   and	   residential	   lands.	   As	   proportion	   to	   the	   total	   ELC	   area,	   this	  
disputed	   land	   represent	   approximately	   just	   8%.	   This	   is	   significant,	   but	   small	  
enough	  for	  the	  government	  and	  the	  company	  to	  resolve	  them	  peacefully	  with	  
the	   affected	  people	  without	  much	   sacrifice.	   Findings	   from	  4	   case	   studies	   by	  
Ngo	  and	  Chan	   (2012)	   indicate	   that	   the	  disputed	   land	  was	  around	  10-­‐15%	  of	  
the	  ELC	  area.	  Nonetheless,	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  these	  land	  conflicts	  should	  have	  
been	   resolved	  as	   the	  government,	   through	   the	   implementation	  of	  Order	  01,	  
has	  cut	  off	  380,000	  hectares	  from	  existing	  ELCs	  and	  it	  represents	  about	  20%	  of	  
the	  total	  ELC	  area.	  	  
	  
	  
While	   ELCs	   are	   meant	   for	   intensive	   agricultural	   and	   industrial-­‐agricultural	  
development,	  many	   ELCs	  were	  held	   inactive,	   or	   their	   development	   progress	  
has	   been	  minimal.	   Evidence	   from	   interviews	   with	   competent	   authorities	   at	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the	  provincial	  level	  indicated	  that	  15-­‐20%	  of	  the	  ELCs	  in	  Kratie	  and	  Mondulkiri	  
had	  any	  operation	  (Ngo	  and	  Chan,	  2012).	  Development	  in	  some	  ELCs	  were	  not	  
possible	   or	   as	   planned	   because	   of	   ongoing	   conflicts	   with	   the	   local	   people	  
while	  some	  other	  ELCs	  were	  just	  held	  for	  speculation,	  thus	  unproductive.	  This	  
usually	  resulted	  in	  encroachment	  by	  residents	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  areas.	  As	  part	  
of	  the	  government’s	  Order	  01,	  MAFF	  and	  MOE	  have	  reviewed	  and	  evaluated	  
the	   implementation	   of	   existing	   ELCs	   that	   have	   led	   to	   cancellation	   and	  
downsizing	  of	  many	  ELCs	  as	  discussed	  above.	  	  
	  
In	  general	  the	  design	  of	  ELC	  mechanism	  itself	  is	  not	  bad.	  It	  is	  meant	  to	  utilize	  
the	   underdeveloped	   land,	   foster	   agricultural	   development	   and	   economic	  
growth,	   generate	   employment	   for	   rural	   people	   and	   revenue	   for	   local	   and	  
national	  government,	  bring	  in	  foreign	  investment	  and	  technology	  to	  overcome	  
the	   local	   limitations	   as	  well	   as	   to	   establish	   links	  with	   international	  markets,	  
and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  conserve	  the	  environment	  and	  ecological	  systems.	  	  
	  
Moreover,	   the	   legal	   framework,	   particularly	   the	   Land	   Law	   2001	   and	   Sub-­‐
decree	  No.	  146	  on	  ELCs	  are	  good	  instruments	  for	  governing	  ELCs,	  but	  it	  is	  just	  
a	  matter	   that	   all	   these	   legal	   provisions	  were	  not	  properly	   implemented.	   For	  
instance,	  the	  legal	  permit	  of	  10,000	  hectares	  maximum	  per	  investor	  for	  up	  to	  
99	  years	  is	  not	  at	  all	  impractical	  since	  there	  are	  instances	  of	  investment	  types	  
that	   would	   need	   that	   large	   chunks	   of	   land	   and	   length	   of	   time	   for	   viable	  
operation.	   The	   ignorance	   lies	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   contacting	   authorities	  
simply	   sign	   a	   uniformed	   deal	  with	  most	   investors	   toward	   the	   ceiling	   permit	  
regardless	  of	  what	  type	  the	  proposed	  business	  is.	  Also,	  while	  the	  law	  permits	  
10,000	  hectares	  maximum	  for	  an	   investor,	  many	  ELC	  cases	  violate	   that	   legal	  
provisions.	  And	  the	  size	  limit	  was	  avoided	  by	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  multiple	  firms	  




Most	   irritatingly,	   the	   legal	   grounds	   were	   not	   even	   adhered	   to	   by	   the	  
contracting	  authorities.	  They	  simply	  bypassed	  the	  lawful	  requirement	  when	  it	  
comes	   to	   actually	   granting	   of	   ELCs.	   Such	   unlawful	   practice	   has	   resulted	   in	  
rapid	   giving	   away	   lands	   to	   investors	   and	   from	   the	   legal	   perspective	  most,	   if	  
not	   all,	   of	   ELCs	   in	   Cambodia	   are	   illegal.	   The	   practice	   has	   made	   the	   legal	  
instruments	   nonsense	   and	   reinforced	   the	   view	   that	   Cambodia	   a	   country	  
without	  room	  for	  rule	  of	  law.	  For	  instance,	  an	  essential	  criterion	  for	  granting	  
ELC,	   the	   site	   in	   subject	   must	   have	   been	   classified	   and	   registered	   as	   state	  
private	   land	   (in	   accordance	  with	   the	   sub-­‐decree	   on	   state	   land	  management	  
and	   the	   sub-­‐decree	   on	   procedures	   for	   establishing	   cadastral	  maps	   and	   land	  
register	  or	   the	  sub	  decree	  on	  sporadic	  registration),	  but	   the	  ELC	  agreements	  
were	  just	  signed	  off	  and	  obliged	  investors	  to	  apply	  and	  register	  the	  land	  later	  
with	  the	  competent	  authority	  as	  state	  private	  land	  (Ngo	  and	  Chan,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Another	   essential	   criterion	   is	   the	   environmental	   and	   social	   impact	  
assessments	   must	   have	   been	   completed	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   land	   use	   and	  
development	  plan	  for	  economic	  land	  concession	  projects.	  In	  practice,	  as	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  land	  classification,	  the	  agreements	  were	  generally	  signed	  off	  while	  the	  
assessment	  would	  be	  conducted	  later;	  often	  with	  poor	  quality	  or	  done	  when	  
the	   ELC	   development	  was	   in	   progress	   or	   almost	   completed	   (Ngo	   and	   Chan,	  
2012).	  Moreover,	  there	  were	  no	  proper	  consultations	  with	  the	  local	  residents.	  
The	   public	   was	   not	   informed	   and	   hence	   there	   were	   often	   erupted	   reactive	  
protests	   from	   the	   local	   communities	   when	   ELC	   development	   started.	  
Oldenburg	   and	   Neef	   (2013)	   also	   noted	   that	   provincial	   and	   local	   authorities	  
were	  often	  not	  even	  aware	  of	  ELCs	  granted	  in	  their	  administrative	  area.	  This	  
also	  suggests	  the	  provincial	  and	  local	  authorities	  were	  often	  not	  consulted	  or	  
adequately	  consulted.	  	  
	  
Another	   important	   aspect	   of	   ELCs	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   were	   actually	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initiated	   and	   granted.	   The	   sub-­‐decree	   provides	   two	   permissible	   ways	   to	  
initiate	   economic	   land	   concession	   projects.	   Solicited	   proposal	   is	   the	   way	   in	  
which	   the	   contracting	   authority	   proposes	   a	   project	   for	   solicitation	   of	  
proposals	   from	   investors;	  unsolicited	  proposal	   is	   the	  case	  where	  an	   investor	  
proposes	  a	  project	  proposal	  to	  the	  state	  for	  approval.	  While	  solicited	  process	  
is	   competitive	   and	   prioritized,	   the	   unsolicited	   proposal	   shall	   only	   be	  
considered	   in	   circumstance	   where	   the	   investor	   promises	   to	   provide	  
exceptional	   advantages	   to	   achieving	   the	   purposes	   of	   economic	   land	  
concessions	   in	   situations	   such	   as:	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   technology;	  
exceptional	   linkages	   between	   social	   land	   concessions	   and	   economic	   land	  
concessions;	  and	  exceptional	  access	  to	  processing	  or	  export	  markets.	  Despite	  
so,	  Neef	   and	  Oldenburg	   (2013)	   did	  not	   observe	   any	   ELCs	   that	  were	   granted	  
through	  solicited	  means;	  the	  unsolicited	  one	  had	  been	  the	  general	  practice.	  	  	  
	  
All	   these	   unlawful	   practices	   and	   implication	   in	   the	   land	   sector	   are	   the	  
complication	  of	   the	  political	   economy	   in	  Cambodia.	  Although	  MAFF	  manage	  
the	   agricultural	   land	   and	   forestland,	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   the	   country’s	  
territory,	   and	   was	   given	   the	   authority	   to	   sign	   ELC	   contracts	   to	   investors,	   it	  
sought	   endorsement	   from	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   Office,	   and	   other	  ministries	  
have	  also	  granted	  the	  ELCs	  in	  the	  same	  manner.	  However,	  the	  interests	  in	  ELC	  
business	   extend	   beyond	   all	   these	   contracting	   authorities.	   Military	   generals	  
and	   local	   business	   tycoons	   are	   key	   players	   and	   drivers	   of	   such	   unlawful	  
practices	  and	  rapid	  transformation	  of	  land	  allocation	  in	  Cambodia20.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  Social	  Land	  Concessions	  in	  Practice	  
	  
Despite	  that	  positive	  step	  in	  SLC	  implementation,	  the	  scale	  of	  SLC	  coverage	  is	  
far	   limited	   if	   compared	   to	   the	   issuance	   of	   ELC	   projects	   and	   the	   degree	   of	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landlessness	  in	  Cambodia.	  Landlessness	  among	  rural	  households	  in	  Cambodia	  
has	   become	   prevalent;	   increasing	   from	   about	   13%	   in	   1997	   to	   20%	   in	   2004	  
(WB,	  2006),	  and	  up	  to	  28%	  by	  2011	  (Pann	  et	  al,	  2015).	  While	  approximate	  2.5	  
million	   Cambodian	   households	   reside	   in	   rural	   areas,	   it	   suggests	   around	  
700,000	  households	  possess	  no	  agricultural	  land.	  If	  such,	  the	  current	  scale	  of	  
SLC	   beneficiaries	   is	   just	   less	   than	   1%	   of	   the	   rural	   landless	   households.	  
Nevertheless,	   nearly	   2	   million	   hectares	   were	   granted	   to	   private	   investors	  
through	  ELC	  projects.	  All	  these	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  pressing	  need	  to	  strike	  
the	  balance	  of	   land	  allocation	  for	  ELC	  and	  SLC	  and	  to	  adequately	  respond	  to	  
landlessness	  that	  can	  cause	  adverse	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  development.	  	  	  
	  
From	  the	  discussion	  with	  key	   informants,	  one	  of	   the	  explanation	   for	  a	  much	  
slower	  progress	  of	  SLC	  implementation	  in	  relation	  to	  ELC	  one	  was	  the	  lawful	  
implementation	   of	   the	   SLC	   project	   while	   ELC	   process	   ignore	   almost	   all	   the	  
legal	   requirement.	   Another	  major	   factor	   is	   the	   political	   economy	  of	   land,	   in	  
which	  eligible	  lands	  are	  usually	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  other	  government	  
entities,	   for	   instance,	   forest	   administration,	   and	   serve	   higher	   interest	   for	  
economic	   concession,	   for	   example,	   than	   for	   social	   concession	   purposes.	   As	  
such,	   it	  was	  observed	  that	  the	  sites	  for	  SLCs,	  when	  granted,	  are	  generally	  on	  
less-­‐	  or	  even	  un-­‐fertile	  lands	  locating	  in	  far	  remote	  areas	  (lack	  of	  roads,	  clean	  
water,	   electricity,	   school,	   and	  health	   centers),	   and	   sometimes	  even	   involved	  
conflicts	  that	  need	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  
	  
The	   design	   of	   the	   SLC	   mechanism	   provides	   great	   opportunity	   for	   the	   local	  
(bottom-­‐up)	  initiatives	  by	  allowing	  the	  commune	  council	  as	  well	  as	  other	  key	  
actors	   at	   the	   local	   level	   to	   propose	   the	   SLC	  project.	  However,	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	  local	  people	  and	  commune	  councils	  are	  aware	  of	  such	  role	  is	  dubious.	  
There	  haven’t	   been	   any	   genuine	   SLC	   initiatives	   or	   proposals	   so	   far21,	   except	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ones	  facilitated	  by	  LASED	  and	  other	  NGO-­‐implemented	  projects.	  	  
	  
As	   reflected	   in	   the	   sub-­‐decrees,	   both	   ELCs	   and	   SLCs	   are	   meant	   and	  
encouraged	   for	   co-­‐existence	   and	   complementarity,	   but	   there	   are	   not	   such	  
cases	  possible	  although	  there	  have	  been	  ELC	  granted	  across	  the	  country.	  The	  
Prime	  Minister22	  was	   also	   aware	  of	   that	   and	  even	   requested	   the	  Council	   for	  
Land	   Policy	   to	   the	   Public-­‐Private	   Partnership”	   model	   which	   involves	   linking	  
social	   and	   economic	   land	   concessions	   to	   create	   contract	   farming	  
arrangements	   to	   benefit	   both	   the	   poor	   the	   recipients	   of	   SLCs	   and	   the	  
concessionaires,	  but	   that	  has	  never	  been	  possible	  despite	   some	   tries	  by	   the	  
Secretariat	   of	   the	   Council	   for	   Land	   Policy	   together	   with	   some	   development	  
partners.	  	  
IV.	  Lessons	  Learned	  and	  Recommendations	  	  
	  
The	   design	   of	   the	   ELC	   scheme	   together	   with	   legal	   framework	   for	   its	  
governance	   was	   good	   given	   the	   need	   to	   develop	   underutilized	   land,	   foster	  
economic	  development,	  and	  create	  rural	  employment,	  but	   the	  way	   in	  which	  
ELC	   was	   granted	   in	   practice	   has	   been	   unlawful	   and	   overshadowed	   the	  
attention	   to	   social	   land	   concession,	   especially	   in	   time	   when	   landlessness	  
among	   rural	   households	   has	   become	   prevalent.	   In	   addition,	   the	   ELC	   has	  
intensified	  the	  problem	  by	  creating	  conflicts	  and	  various	  negative	  impacts	  on	  
society	  and	  ecological	  system	  although	  it	  has	  also	  provided	  positive	  impacts	  in	  
many	   instances,	   which	   include	   the	   inflow	   of	   foreign	   investment	   and	  
technology,	   job	   creation,	   increased	   domestic	   production	   and	   productivity,	  
rents,	  and	  export.	  	  
	  
The	  government’s	  decision	  to	  place	  a	  moratorium	  on	  granting	  new	  ELC	  in	  May	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  at	  the	  Official	  Inauguration	  of	  the	  New	  Building	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Land	  Management,	  Urban	  
Planning	  and	  Construction,	  Phnom	  Penh,	  09	  February	  2012	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2012	   was	   the	   right	   step	   in	   time	   and	   was	   indicating	   the	   government’s	  
acknowledgement	   of	   its	   implementation	   failure.	   The	   moratorium	   has	   been	  
accompanied	  by	  serious	  reform,	  providing	  land	  titles	  to	  affected	  peoples	  and	  
cancellation	   and	   downsize	   of	   ELC.	   These	   efforts	   were	   great	   and	   should	  
continue,	  but	  there	  is	  a	  legitimate	  question	  on	  how	  the	  cancelled	  ELCs	  should	  
be	  reallocated.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  several	  options	  for	  the	  reallocation	  including	  
community	   forestry	   or	   community	   protected	   areas,	   reserved	   forestland,	  
protected	   forest,	   social	   land	   concession,	   and	   economic	   land	   concession.	  
Should	   economic	   land	   concessions	   be	   part	   of	   the	   next	   consideration,	   the	  
government	   must	   adhere	   to	   the	   principles	   and	   procedure	   under	   the	   legal	  
provision	  and	  the	  following	  steps	  are	  highly	  recommended.	  	  
	  
1) The	   government	   must	   have	   a	   clear	   classification,	   demarcation,	   and	  
complete	  registration	  of	  both	  state	  public	   land	  and	  state	  private	   land.	  
That	  will	  serve	  a	  	  foundation	  for	  the	  government	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  
within	  the	  legal	  framework	  with	  regard	  to	  land	  allocation.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  effort	  should	  aim	  to	  have	  a	  complete	  registeration	  of	  private	  
land	  across	   the	  country	   including	   issuing	   the	  communal	   land	  titles	   for	  
the	  indigenous	  peoples.	  	  
	  
2) A	  comprehensive	  study	  be	  undertaken	  to	  develop	  national	  or	  regional	  
land	   use	   and	   development	  master	   plan	   (s)	   giving	   highest	   values	   to	   i)	  
ecosystem	   sustainability,	   ii)	   livelihoods	   and	   land	   use	   tenure	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   people	   and	   local	   residents,	   and	   iii)	   bio-­‐diversity	  
preservation.	  When	  areas	  are	  well	  marked	  for	  protecting	  or	  promoting	  
these	   values,	   the	   rest	  of	   state	   land	   is	   left	   for	  deriving	   immediate	  and	  
long-­‐term	  desirable	  economic	  benefits	  such	  as	  commercial	  plantation,	  
agro-­‐industry,	   hydro	   power,	   mining,	   and	   large	   scale	   infrastructure	  
projects.	  This	  process	  requires	  multidisciplinary	  approach	  and	  extensive	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technical	   assistance	   and	   stakeholders	   consultations,	   thus	   may	   take	   a	  
few	  years	  at	  least.	  	  
	  
3) The	   areas	   left	   for	   agriculture,	   mining	   or	   development	   shall	   then	   be	  
studied	   and	   classified	   for	   different	   economic	   purposes	   according	   to	  
natural	  endowments	  such	  as	  soil	  quality,	  moisture/climate	  conditions,	  
elevation,	   water	   sources,	   and	   potential	   mineral	   deposits.	   A	   map	   of	  
state	   cultivable	   land	   should	   then	  be	   produced.	   This	   process	  may	   also	  
take	   a	   number	   of	   years	   or	   much	   longer	   depending	   on	   availability	   of	  
technical	  and	  financial	  resources	  for	  such	  study.	  
	  
4) The	  disposable	  state	  land	  aside	  from	  the	  protected	  or	  reserved	  for	  the	  
values	  mentioned	  above,	  shall	  then	  be	  either	  allocated	  for	  i)	  land	  poor	  
or	   landless	   households	   to	   use	   and	   then	   own	   free	   of	   charge	   (through	  
social	  land	  concession	  programs)	  or	  ii)	  for	  perpetual	  leasehold	  by	  both	  
smallholders	  and	   large	  scale	   investors	  (through	  solicited	  ELCs	  or	  other	  
state	  land	  development	  schemes).	  	  
	  
5) For	  the	  cultivable	  state	  land	  that	  is	  allocated	  for	  leasehold	  (but	  not	  free	  
holding	  or	  social	  land	  concession)	  should	  be	  well	  marked	  in	  preferably	  
small	  plots	  (a	  few	  hundred	  hectares	  or	  less	  each)	  and	  put	  up	  for	  public	  
bidding	  before	  granting	  perpetual	   lease	  or	  economic	   land	  concession.	  
Sub-­‐lease	   to	   or	   contract	   farming	   agreement	   with	   smallholders	   or	  
farming	  households	  (several	  or	  dozens	  hectares	  each)	  shall	  be	  allowed	  
unrestrictedly	  and	  conveniently.	  This	  is	  to	  raise	  the	  accessibility	  of	  local	  
investors/farmers	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   large	  ones	   or	   for	   equity	   reason	  other	   than	  
social	   purpose.	   Tactically	   free	   economic	   land	   concessions	   to	   non-­‐




6) The	   state	   land	   lease	   or	   fee-­‐based	   concession	   should	   be	   charged	   per	  
unit	  of	  hectare	  (with	  variation	  by	  type	  of	  soil	  quality	  and	  types	  of	  crops)	  
and	  on	  an	  annual	  basis	  whether	  the	  leasees/concessionaires	  cultivate	  it	  
or	  not.	  This	   is	  to	  simplify	  the	  administration	  and	  collection	  of	  revenue	  
from	   the	   state	   land	   and	   to	   encourage	   the	   leasees/concessionaires	   to	  
optimize	   the	   land	   use	   and	   produces	   from	   the	   land.	   The	   annual	  
lease/royalty	   rate	   is	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   public	   auctions	   or	  
predetermined	   for	   every	   five	   years	   and	   adjustable	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
period.	  Under	  current	  legal	  regime,	  the	  rental	  fee	  of	  $8-­‐12	  per	  hectare	  
is	   too	   low	   and	   irrelevant	   while	   the	   market	   rate	   paid	   by	   smallholder	  
farmers	   is	  much	  way	  higher.	  The	  amendment	  of	   the	   legal	  provision	   is	  
thus	   necessary.	   The	   lease/concession	   duration	   can	   be	   10	   years,	   25	  
years,	  35	  years,	  50	  years	  or	  longer	  depending	  on	  the	  life	  of	  the	  crop	  to	  
be	  planted	  as	  per	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  lease/concession	  contract	  or	  for	  
desirable	  development	  purpose.	  	  
	  
Given	   lessons	   from	   the	   ELC	   implementation	   thus	   far	   and	   for	   improving	   the	  
management	   of	   the	   exiting	   ELCs,	   this	   paper	   would	   like	   to	   recommend	   as	  
follow:	  	  
	  
1) Reportedly,	  many	  of	  the	  existing	  concessions	  are	  not	  yet	  cultivated	  as	  
planned	  or	  agreed	   in	  the	  contract	  between	  the	  concession	  companies	  
and	   the	   government	   contracting	   authority.	   It	   is	   therefore	  
recommended	   that	   a	   strict	   review	   is	   carried	   out	   and	   contract	  
requirements	   are	   enforced	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   revoke	   the	   concession	  
contracts	  from	  those	  who	  materially	  breach	  the	  contracts	  or/and	  laws	  
and	  return	  the	  unused	  or	  under-­‐used	  or	  misused	  land	  to	  the	  State	  for	  
conservation	   or	   redistribution	   purposes.	   In	   especially	   the	   past	   two	  
years,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Environment	   has	   cancelled	   a	   large	   number	   of	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concessions	  under	  its	   jurisdiction,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  applauded.	  However,	  
MAFF	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  expectations	  and	  there	  should	  be	  
more	  efforts	  in	  strictly	  implementing	  the	  contracts.	  	  	  
	  
2) For	  the	  operational	  ELCs,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  risk	  of	  lack	  of	  labour	  to	  work	  in	  
the	  areas,	  especially	  the	  remote	  ones.	   It	   is	  suggested	  that	  a	  minimum	  
wage,	  which	   is	  to	  be	  above	  the	  prevailing	  market	  rate	  at	  urban	  areas,	  
be	   set	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Labor	   and	   applied	   on	   labor-­‐intensive	  
plantations	   such	  as	   rubber,	  oil	   palm,	  and	  black	  pepper,	   etc.	   This	   is	   to	  
encourage	   adequate	   numbers	   of	   Cambodian	   workers	   in	   the	   remote	  
plantations.	  Alternative	  to	  a	  minimum	  wage,	  concessionaire	  employers	  
should	   be	   required	   to	   provide	   the	   workers	   with	   reasonable	   living	  
conditions	  such	  as	  proper	  housing	  and	  healthcare.	  	  
	  	  
3) The	  Labour	  Law	  should	  be	  strictly	  enforced	  in	  the	  plantations	  and	  other	  
large	   farms.	   Foreign	  workers	   in	   the	   areas	   have	   to	   possess	   valid	  work	  
permit	  and	  abide	  by	  the	  terms	  set	  in	  the	  immigration	  and	  labour	  laws.	  
Additional	   regulatory	  and	  administrative	  measures	  may	  be	  needed	   to	  
ensure	   that	   there	  will	   not	   be	   dominant	   immigrants	   to	   settle	   for	   long	  
term	   or	   forever	   in	   the	   remote	   plantations,	   especially	   those	   near	  
national	   border	   areas.	   The	   Ministry	   of	   Labour	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Interior	   should	   undertake	   frequent	   and	   regular	   joint	   monitoring	   and	  
control	  of	  the	  settlers	  in	  ELCs.	  	  
	  
4) Annual	   property	   tax	   and	  unused	   land	   tax	   for	   underused/unused	   ELCs	  
should	  be	  considered	  and	  imposed	  to	  promote	  productive	  land	  use.	  For	  
transparent,	   predictable	   and	   convenient	   declaration	   and	   collection	  
these	  two	  taxes	  should	  be	  imposed	  based	  on	  clear	  price	  zoning	  set	  by	  
MEF	  after	  consulting	  with	  MLMUPC.	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